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Critique	and	the	Real	Thing	
	
	IGLP	Conference,	Harvard	University,	2-3	June	2018		 Vanja	Hamzić		Thank	you	very	much,	Duncan	and	David,	for	this	extraordinarily	enjoyable	opportunity	to	reflect	on	what	is	for	me	one	of	Duncan’s	most	inspirational	and	eye-opening	texts.1	What	I	can	offer	today,	in	the	interest	of	time,	are	but	brief	insurrectionary	snippets	of	thought	that	do	 not	 address	 any	 of	 the	 four	Duncan’s	 genealogies	 of	 critical	 theory	per	 se,	 but	 rather	suggest	a	modest	rethinking	of	such	mapping	exercise,	so	as	to	tease	out	not	only	the	critical	tensions	between	these	genealogies	but	also	that	which	might	be	their	potentially	common	epistemic	limit.	I	would	like	to	do	so	by	highlighting	the	ontological	aspects	of	Duncan’s	text,	albeit	 for	 the	purposes	 of	 probing	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 knowable	 in	 certain	 strands	of	 social	scientific	 thought	 that	 Duncan	 maps	 and	 engages	 with.	 I	 do	 so,	 in	 Duncan’s	 lingo,	 as	 a	paranoid	poststructuralist	 antinomianist	who	 is	 an	ontological	 agnostic	 and	 therefore,	 at	best,	a	 ‘wild	Marxist’	 inasmuch	as	both	anthropological	and	philosophical	structuralism	is	presumed	as	a	sine	qua	non	of	a	certain	Marxist	intellectual	tradition—Marx,	Lacan	and	Lévi-Strauss	included.		 My	 focus	 on	 ontology	 is	 partly	 informed	 by	 my	 profound	 discomfort	 with	 any	attempts	at	a	universalised	sociology	à	la	Weber	and	the	one-structure-fits-all	anthropology	à	 la	Lévi-Strauss,	both	relying	on	a	single	all-encompassing	ontology	 irrespective—to	use	again	Duncan’s	critical	language—of	how	one	might	theorise	the	relationship	between	the	presumed	social	whole	and	its	parts	and,	also,	regardless	of	the	fact	that	 the	core	of	such	social	whole	might	be	hollow.	 If	 ontology	 is	not	one	but	many,	or	 even	 if	 there	 can	exist	human	 and	 non-human	 worldings	 that	 are	 ontologically	 disparate	 or	 distant	 from	 one	another,	then	what	we	are	left	with	at	best	are	Strathernian	‘partial	connections’,	rather	than	a	 singular	 ontology	 informing	 our	 methodological	 orientations:	 a	 science	 of	 meaningful	miscommunications	rather	than	an	overarching	rationality;	an	endeavour	co-constitutive	of	its	semantic	 limits	rather	 than,	perhaps,	performing	within	 the	superstructure	of	an	über	social	langue.		 I	am	guided,	at	the	outset,	by	Duncan’s	proposal	that	‘“[t]he	real”,	by	definition,	is	that	which	exceeds,	can’t	be	grasped	by,	unpredictably	disrupts	any	attempt	to	reduce	it	to	what	can	 be	 represented	 in	 the	 langue	 in	 question’.2	 That	 is,	 I	want	 to	 interrogate	 that	which	Duncan	 variably	 identifies	 as	 ‘the	 unconscious’,	 ‘the	 inexpressible’,	 ‘the	 thing	 beyond	 the	
																																																						1	Kennedy	2001.	2	Ibid:	1179.	
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horizon’,	which	I	call	the	unknowable.	This	spectral	thing,	I	propose,	is	haunting	academia—an	apparition	liminal	and	subversive,	lurking	in	the	darkness	beyond	knowledge.	What	could	be	framed	as	an	ontological	question	proper	about	that-which-is-unknowable	yet	forming	a	constitutive	element	of	being	human	has	resurfaced	in	anthropology	and	has	found	renewed	salience	in	continental	philosophy,	whilst	its	application	to	political	theory	holds	the	promise	of	resisting	the	notion	that	politics	is	(ever)	an	ontology.	In	each	of	these	fields	of	inquiry,	the	unknowable	(pre)figures	as	a	condition	of	reality—it’s	a	thing	in	that	it	is	thinkable	as	thing	or,	 for	some,	as	things.	And,	 just	as	 is	the	custom	with	spectres,	 it	has	come	back	to	us	in	turns.	 Let	 me,	 therefore,	 in	 the	 remainder	 of	 my	 intervention,	 engage	 with	 the	 three	heterodox	turns	in	anthropology,	continental	philosophy	and	political	science	that	address	the	unknowable	and	are,	as	such,	 in	my	mind,	 important	companions	to	Duncan’s	critical	endeavours.		In	anthropology,	the	unknowable	makes	a	most	notable	comeback	within	the	purview	of	the	so-called	ontological	turn.	Here	the	unknowable	appears	not	as	a	thing,	but	as	things—and	things	to	think	with	at	that.	The	editors	of	a	seminal	anthology,	entitled	Thinking	Through	
Things,3	thus	call	for	a	renewed	attention	to	things	with	a	view	to	divesting	them	from	any	preconceived	 anthropological	 knowledge	 of	 what	 they	 might	 be.	 The	 proposed	 move	 is	distinctly	 ontological	 in	 that	 it	 insists	 on	 replacing	 ‘thing-as-analytic’	 with	 ‘thing-as-heuristic’:4	the	ethnographer	is	invited	to	suspend	the	familiar	meanings	of	things	so	as	to	make	space,	cognitive	and	otherwise,	for	the	unfamiliar	meanings	of	things—those	imparted	by	 the	ethnographer’s	 interlocutors—to	be	on	 their	own	terms.	At	 issue,	of	course,	 is	 the	problem	 of	 representation—that	 what	 comes	 through	 anthropological	 interpretation	 of	things,	people,	cultures…	through	an	always-already	Euro-American	ontological	matrix.	To	counter	 such	 epistemic	 violence	 and	 allow	 for	 other	 worldings—the	 worldings	 of	 the	observed	others—to	appear	meaningfully,	the	ethnographer	is	to	concede	at	the	outset	that	much	 of	 such	 ways	 of	 being-in-the-world	 is	 to	 remain	 unobservable,	 unknowable,	ontologically	disparate.	Thinking	through	things,	it	seems,	implies	thinking	things	through	whilst	realising,	even	perhaps	a	priori,	the	limits	of	one’s	(anthropological)	knowledge.		In	philosophy,	the	ontological	domain	of	the	unknowable	has	reappeared	within	the	various	 strands	 of	 continental	 materialism	 and	 realism	 that	 make	 up	 the	 so-called	speculative	turn.	Of	those,	the	most	intriguing	seems	to	me	to	be	one	that	finds	its	origin	not	in	a	philosophical	project	per	se	but	that	of	Jacques	Lacan’s	structuralist	psychoanalysis.	Its	colourful	 proponent,	 none	 other	 than	 Slovenian	 transcendental	materialist	 Slavoj	 Žižek,5	
																																																						3	Henare,	Holbraad	&	Wastell	2007.	4	Ibid:	5.	5	I	tend	to	agree	with	Adrian	Johnson	(2008)	that	such	designation	of	Žižek’s	(never	quite	non-ambiguous)	philosophical	 leanings	 makes	 sense	 particularly	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 present	 analysis,	 that	 is,	 for	discerning	certain	aspects	of	Žižek’s	ontology.		
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relies	 on	 Lacan’s	 life-long	 preoccupation	 with	 the	 Real	 (le	 réel),	 which,	 along	 with	 the	Symbolic	and	the	Imaginary,	forms	the	very	topology	of	‘human	reality’	(réalité	humaine)6—a	topology	that	Lacan	theorises	as	interlocking	its	three	constitutive	elements	into	a	type	of	Borromean	 knot.7	 Thus,	 the	 Lacanian	 Real	 is	 that-which-is-unknowable	 in/qua	 both	 the	symbolic	 and	 the	 imaginary	 registers	 of	 human	 psyche,8	 that-whose-presence	 ultimately	serves	to	confirm	reality’s	own	limitation.	Or,	as	Žižek	puts	it,	‘it	is	not	part	of	reality	but	a	kind	of	inexistent	point	of	reference	with	no	place	in	reality	which,	in	its	absence,	structures	reality’.9		Finally,	 in	 political	 theory,	 the	 Real	 as	 the	 spectre	 of	 the	 unknowable	 could	 be	understood	as	an	antidote	to	Realpolitik	inasmuch	as	it	introduces	an	external	to	the	political	(le	politique)	and,	by	extension,	to	that	what	might	be	called	everyday	politics	(la	politique).	The	 result,	 as	 averred	 by	 Susan	 Buck-Morss:	 ‘politics	 is	 not	 an	 ontology’	 or,	 even	more	provocatively,	‘the	ontological	is	never	political’.10	To	arrive	at	this	conclusion,	Buck-Morss	retraces	 the	 transformation	 of	 Karl	 Marx’s	 initial	 ontological	 philosophy	 towards	 an	engagement	 with	 the	 nascent	 social	 sciences—including	 anthropology,	 psychology,	sociology	and	economics—understood	as	sciences	of	history	proper.11	A	critical	potential	immanent	in	this	turn	meant	for	Buck-Morss	not	a	return	of	the	kind	of	political	philosophy	that	presumes	an	ontological	primacy—the	return	of	the	political—but	the	birth	of	‘social	theory	done	 reflectively—that	 is,	 critically’:12	 the	 advent	 of	 critical	 theory.	Hence,	 argues	Buck-Morss,	‘when	Marx	said	thinking	was	itself	a	practice,	he	meant	it	in	this	sense.	He	did	not	then	ask:	What	is	the	ontological	meaning	of	the	being	of	practice?	Instead,	he	tried	to	find	 out	 as	much	 as	 he	 could	 about	 the	 socio-historical	 practices	 of	 human	beings	 in	 his	time’.13	For	Buck-Morss,	the	ontological	divorce	between	the	two	differently-gendered	forms	of	 politics	 opens	 up	 a	 space	 for	 experimentation—a	 Benjaminian	 Spielraum—in	 which,	ultimately,	‘the	world	can	be	otherwise’.14	The	spectre	of	the	unknowable	is	no	longer	just	dreadful	 and	 abject—it	 recuperates	 some	 of	 the	 Lacanian	 possibility	 that	 the	 reality	 of	
																																																						6	See,	for	example,	Lacan	&	Granoff	1986.	7	Greenshields	2017:	203–263.	8	 Lacan	 proposes	 the	metaphor	 of	 the	 table	 to	 illustrate	 this	 point.	 The	 imaginary	 table	 is	 a	 kind	 of	repository	of	the	functions	of	the	thing	known	as	‘table’:	one	can	eat	on	it,	put	a	vase	on	it,	and	so	on.	The	symbolic	table	is	the	word	‘table’	that	finds	its	meaning	in	discourse,	in	expressions	such	as	à	table!	or	
faire	table	rase	or	table	des	matières.	The	Real	is	constituted	of	the	rest,	that	is,	what	one	doesn’t	know	about	the	table.	9	Žižek	2016:	67	(emphasis	mine).	10	Buck-Morss	2013:	57.	11	Ibid:	60.	12	Ibid.	13	Ibid	(emphasis	in	original).	14	Ibid:	75.	
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human	psyche,	 inclusive	of	 that	which	 is	 constitutively	 external	 to	 it,	 can	be	not	 always-already	traumatic.			Each	 of	 these	 three	 disciplinary	 endeavours	 grapples	 with	 critique,	 either	 as	 its	preferred	modus	operandi	or	an	estranged	praxis—the	latter	sometimes	being	described	as	a	‘post-critical’	stance15	or	even	an	antithesis	to	critique.	Let	me,	therefore,	say	a	few	more	words	 about	 each	of	 these	 turns’	 complex	 relationship	with	 critique,	 albeit	 still	 from	 the	perspective	of	the	unknowable—my	‘critical	object’	proper.		
The	Unknowable	and	the	Ontological	Turn	in	Anthropology	With	its	tripartite	focus	on	reflexivity,	conceptualisation	and	experimentation	as	analytical	practices,	 the	 main	 claim	 of	 the	 ontological	 turn	 still	 seems	 to	 be	 that	 it	 is	 strictly	
methodological,	 i.e.	 its	 concern	 is	decidedly	not	with	 ‘what	 the	 “really	 real”	nature	of	 the	world	is’	but,	rather,	with	posing	‘ontological	questions	to	solve	epistemological	problems’.16	If	this	appears	confusing	that	is	just	fine	because,	according	to	Holbraad	and	Pedersen’s	The	
Ontological	 Turn:	 An	 Anthropological	 Exposition,17	 a	 recent	 addition	 to	 the	 ever-growing	literature	on	 this	 turn,	 ‘it	 so	happens	 that	 epistemology	 in	 anthropology	has	 to	be	 about	ontology,	 too’.18	However,	 an	ontology	 is	not	even	gestured	at	 in	 their	book,	 for	 to	do	 so	would	be	to	acknowledge	that	a	 ‘really	real’	of	sorts	exists	as	such.	Instead,	one	is	guided	towards	 a	 set	 of	 techniques	 aimed	 at	 ‘freeing	 thought	 from	 all	 metaphysical	foundationalism—whether	substantive	or	methodological,	normative	or	pluralistic’.19	This	remarkable	 objective,	 if	 at	 all	 feasible,	 should	 help	 the	 fieldworker	 not	 so	 much	 to	 see	differently	as	to	see	different	things	 in	the	field,	 for	it	 is	no	longer	through	 them	but	 from	them	that	thinking	should	be	done.	Having	‘de-theorised’	the	thing	by	getting	rid	of	its	any	presupposed	analytical	connotation—a	move	proposed	by	Thinking	Through	Things—one	is	now	presumably	ready	to	follow	The	Ontological	Turn’s	instruction	in	filling	the	thing	back	up,	albeit	only	contingently,	‘according	to	its	own	ethnographic	exigencies’.20	The	point	is	to	allow	the	thing	to	become	the	empirical	source	of	 ‘conceptualisation’—to	let	it,	as	it	were,	differentiate	 itself.	But	if	the	thing,	so	self-differentiated,	can	be	 free	 ‘from	any	ontological	determination	whatsoever’,21	as	Holbraad	and	Pedersen	would	have	it,	then	the	thing	in	and	
																																																						15	For	a	recent	exposition	of	such	an	approach	in	literary	and	cultural	studies,	see	generally	Anker	&	Felski	2017,	where	‘post-critique’	is	described	as	‘less	concerned	with	hammering	home	a	“critique	of	critique”	than	with	testing	out	new	possibilities	and	intellectual	alternatives’	(ibid:	2).					16	Holbraad	&	Pedersen	2017:	x.	17	Ibid.	18	Ibid.	19	Ibid:	68	(emphasis	in	original).	20	Ibid:	211.	21	Ibid:	210.	
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of	itself	points	to	its	(radical)	unknowability.	The	thing’s	very	‘conceptual	affordances’	seem	to	be	coming	 from	an	epistemic	abyss	where	 the	humanly	unknowable	reigns.	Moreover,	although	this	move	is	billed	as	distinctly	posthumanist,	the	(radical)	unknowability	of	the	thing	is	always	in	relation	to	humans.	The	unknowable	also	appears	front	and	centre	in	another	important	feature	of	the	ontological	turn—its	reliance	on	the	inherent	multiplicity	of	meaning.	Having	chartered	an	intellectual	map	of	their	turn	that	includes	not	only	the	obvious	(e.g.	Eduardo	Viveiros	de	Castro)	 but	 also	 somewhat	 speculative	 candidates	 (such	 as	 Roy	 Wagner	 and	 Marilyn	Strathern—neither	of	which	explicitly	centred	their	work	on	the	ontological),	Holbraad	and	Pedersen	 provide	 a	 detailed	 exploration	 of	 the	 techniques	 and	 terms-of-art	 used	 by	 the	(ostensibly)	 like-minded	anthropologists	 to	account	 for	 the	problem	of	 translation	across	the	different	conceptual	 regimes	 that	 the	 fieldworker	and	 those	 ‘in	 the	 field’	are	 likely	 to	inhabit.	Invention,	obviation,	relation,	postplural	abstraction,	perspectivism	and	other	such	concepts—all	are	arrived	at	by	observing	what	Viveiros	de	Castro	calls	 ‘equivocation’:	an	inevitable	series	of	‘errors’	that	befall	any	attempt	to	‘successfully’	translate	between	two	or	more	ontologically	different	conceptual	regimes.	But,	neither	for	Viveiros	de	Castro	nor	for	Holbraad	and	Pedersen	is	this	failure	to	understand	necessarily	a	bad	thing:	talking	past	each	other,	 if	 ‘controlled’,	can	result	 in	new	conceptualisations,	especially	 if	 it	causes	long-held	anthropological	 assumptions	 to	 transform	 by	 the	 power	 of	 contradicting	 ethnographic	materials.22	 At	 issue	 is,	 however,	 not	 only	 the	 ‘problem’	 of	 ontological	 disparity	 that	confounds	 translation	 but	 so	 presumed	mutual	 unknowability	 of	 people	 (and	 things)	 in	conversation,	 too.	 If	 meanings	 are	 always	 already	 multiple	 so	 that	 cross-ontological	understanding	is	at	best	unlikely,	the	unknowable	appears	as	a	necessary	condition	of	one’s	ontologically	informed	knowledge	about	the	other.	And	it	occupies	a	spectral	position	not	at	all	unlike	to	that	of	 the	Lacanian	Real:	 in	 its	paradoxical,	 constitutive	absence-presence	 it	reveals	reality’s	own	limitation—at	least	inasmuch	as	a	potential	reality	can	be	observed	in	the	field	qua	a	conceptual	regime.	
The	Lacanian	Real	and	the	Speculative	Turn	in	Philosophy		Needless	 to	 say,	 the	 becoming	 of	 objects	 (things)	 in	 and	 of	 themselves	 has	 also	 been	 a	preoccupation	 of	 a	 number	 of	 exponents	 of	 the	 so-called	 speculative	 turn	 in	 continental	philosophy,	and	even	the	very	possibility	of	an	empirically-grounded	disparity	of	things	can	sometimes	take	centre	stage	in	thinking	‘difference’	as	such.	The	most	explicit	connection	between	ontological	difference	and	the	unknowable	qua	the	Lacanian	Real	is,	however,	made	in	 Slavoj	 Žižek’s	 works.	 For	 Žižek,	 the	 Real—that	 spectre	 of	 reality’s	 never-quite-
																																																						22	Ibid:	185–188.	
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completeness—appears	precisely	as	an	insurmountable	parallactic	gap.	Defined	as	a	discord	in	the	‘order’	of	Being—and	of	primarily	that-what-is-observable-about-Being—ontological	difference	in	Žižek	is	of	a	decidedly	structuralist	nature.	This,	of	course,	 is	not	surprising,	given	Lacan’s	own	structuralism,	which	he	inherited,	for	the	large	part,	from	the	farther	of	structural	anthropology,	Claude	Lévi-Strauss.23	Specifically,	Lévi-Strauss’	writing	in	the	early	stages	 of	 the	 development	 of	 his	 theory	 of	 structural	 transformation	 presupposes,	 for	example,	a	‘psychic	unity’	of	humankind.24	Žižek’s	theory	of	the	Real	thus	comes	full	circle,	with	Lévi-Strauss’	early	structuralism	also	significantly	foregrounding	the	oeuvre	of	Viveiros	de	Castro—that	ontologically-minded	anthropologist	par	excellence.			 The	 foundational	 feature	 of	 Žižek’s	 theory	 of	 the	 Real—which,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	makes	 his	 work	 anthropologically	 relevant—is	 that	 it	 constitutes	 a	 limit	 to	 both	 the	observability	of	the	thing	and,	mutatis	mutandis,	of	the	human.	Here,	to	observe	is	to	know	and	to	know	is	 to	observe—a	proposition	not	at	all	unattractive	to	ontologically-oriented	anthropologists	 who	 deal	 in	 epistemological	 quandaries.	 Even	 if	 one	 (so	 oriented	anthropologist)	might	ask	whither	the	field(work)	in	Žižek,	it	is	obvious	that	his	observations	on	 reality’s	 ultimate	 incompleteness	 make	 sense	 precisely	 with	 respect	 to	 how	 onto-epistemic	limits	are	understood—in	the	field,	or	elsewhere.			 However,	 in	 anthropology	 and	 in	 continental	 philosophy	 alike,	 structuralism	 has	many	critics.	For	our	purposes,	it	is	instructive	to	recall	Judith	Butler’s	critique	of	the	Real	in	Žižek	as	a	decidedly	post-structuralist	(and	feminist)	attempt	to	address	his	discursive	failure	to	totalise	what	she	calls	‘the	social	field’.25	In	fact,	writes	Butler,	any	attempt	to	totalise	this	field	should	be	read	as	a	symptom,	revealing	the	trauma	of	the	Real	in	its	full	potential	of	‘disrupting	and	rendering	contingent	any	discursive	formation	that	lays	claim	to	a	coherent	or	 seamless	 account	 of	 reality’.26	 At	 issue,	 if	 you	will,	 is	 the	 very	 order	 of	 things	 and	 its	totalising	assumptions—Lacan’s	and	Lévi-Straussian	‘laws’	of	Being	and	Žižek’s	mostly	tacit	adoption	of	them.		Butler	demonstrates,	 for	example,	how	the	Lacanian	proposition	 ‘la	 femme	n’existe	
pas’	(‘Woman	does	not	exist’),	unproblematised	by	Žižek,	reveals	that	what	is	traumatic	is	the	non-existence	of	Woman,	‘that	is,	the	fact	of	her	castration’.27	If	symbolisation	is	denied	precisely	at	this	‘fissure’—that	is,	if	the	Real	manifests	itself	exactly	at	this	presupposed	limit	
																																																						23	Arguably,	Lévi-Strauss’	‘The	Effectiveness	of	Symbols’	(1968)	and	‘Language	and	the	Analysis	of	Social	Laws’	(1951)	were	particularly	meaningful	to	Lacan,	and	they	feature	throughout	his	Écrits	(1966a).		24	Holbraad	&	Pedersen	2017:	169.	25	Butler	1993:	192.	26	Ibid.	27	Ibid:	203.		
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of	what	 could	be—might	 it	not	 reveal	 something	altogether	different:	 a	patriarchal	 social	order	that	both	Lacan	and	Žižek	seem	to	inhabit	unproblematically?		Dangerous,	 then,	 is	 the	very	operation	of	ontological	structuralism,	which	vests	an	outside	to	the	socially	intelligible	with	ostensibly	pre-ideological	‘laws’,	thereby	precluding	the	 possibility	 of	 politicising	 the	 relation	 between,	 say,	 discourse	 and	 the	 Real.	 This	 is	because	such	‘laws’	of	necessity	posit	themselves	as	resistant	to	critique.	At	issue	is	the	fixity	of	relations	within	the	presumed	ontological	structure,	which	leads	to	‘a	prepolitical	pathos	that	 precludes	 the	 kind	 of	 analysis	 that	 would	 take	 the	 [R]eal/reality	 distinction	 as	 the	instrument	 and	 effect	 of	 contingent	 relations	 of	 power’.28	 To	 call	 for	 unfixing	 of	 such	relations,	as	Butler	does,	is	not	to	deny	the	unknowable,	but	to	make	some	of	its	discursive	deployments	politically	accountable.					
The	Spectre	of	Commonist	Ethics	in	Political	Theory	Much	as	with	other	conceptual	regimes,29	it	is	difficult	for	political	theory,	even	at	its	most	experimental,	to	contemplate	an	external	to	itself,	that	is,	an	outside	to	its	core	element	of	study.	 Susan	 Buck-Morss’	 conceptualisation	 of	 her	 ‘commonist’	 ethics	 is	 all	 the	 more	remarkable	 for	 attempting	 to	do	 just	 that:	 to	 theorise	 an	outside	 to	both	 the	political	 (le	
politique)	and	daily	politics	(la	politique),	albeit	not	without	an	explicit	rejection	of	ontology.	What’s	peculiar	for	this	rejection	is	that	‘the	multiple	ways	of	political	being-in-the	world’30	are	not	denied;	rather,	Buck-Morss’	project	seeks	to	divest	political	philosophy	from	an	urge	to	search	for	the	 ‘ontological	essence’	within	empirical	political	 life—precisely	because	of	the	likely	political	consequences	of	such	a	mission.	The	point	is	that	our	ways	of	being-in-the-word,	replete	as	they	are	with	many	categories	of	personhood,	‘do	not	fit	neatly	into	our	politics’—whatever	our	professed	political	orientation(s).31	For	the	same	reason,	Realpolitik	can	be	rejected	as	‘all	too	real’	precisely	for	its	inability	to	grasp	the	above	pluralities.	One	can	presume,	then,	that	the	unknowable	serves	to	de-essentialise	any	conceptualisation	of	the	political,	for	it	provides	for	a	(constitutive)	spectral	externality	to	such	efforts.	This,	in	turn,	opens	up	an	experimental	space	in	which,	politically,	the	world	could	be	otherwise.32			Startlingly,	 this	 anti-ontological	 stance	 bears	 an	 uncanny	 resemblance	 with	 the	ontological	 turn	 in	 anthropology,	 precisely	 inasmuch	 as	 it	 introduces	 a	 crisis	 of	 the	ontological	 as	 a	 political	 (and	 ethical)	 act	 (although	 it	 could	 also	 be	 described	 as	 a	methodology),	intent	to	dispel	a	priori	ontological	assumptions.	One	can	presume	that	this	
																																																						28	Ibid:	207.		29	For	a	meditation	on	an	outside	to	law—alegality—and	its	inherent	complexities,	see	Hamzić	2017.	30	Buck-Morss	2013:	57	31	Ibid.	32	Cf.	ibid:	75.	
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positionality	also	shares	in	a	Butlerian	post-structuralist	concern	with	contingent	relations	of	power	in	the	world,	especially	since	Buck-Morss	explicitly	tasks	critical	theory	with	doing	social	theory	reflexively.33	Nothing	quite	is	for	Buck-Morss	prior	to	thoroughly	experimental	materialist	collective	politics,	and	with	it,	prior	to	life’s	many	ostensibly	‘ontic’	forms.	The	unknowable,	in	particular,	with	its	potential	for	perpetual	externalisation,	renders	ontology	politically	redundant,	if	not	outright	dangerous.		Is	it	then	apt	to	account	for	an	onto-epistemic	‘messiness	of	life’	with	respect	to	all	three	 of	 our	 conceptual	 regimes—anthropology,	 continental	 philosophy	 and	 political	theory—especially	 since	 the	 spectre	of	 the	unknowable	 seems	 to	make	 relatively	 similar	appearances—and,	crucially,	perform	cognate	functions—across	these	fields?		
Epilogue:	Spillages	of	the	Real	It	may	seem	odd	that	one	can	think	from	anywhere/anyone	but	oneself	and	that	the	direction	of	one’s	thought,	if	such	can	be,	is	always	projecting	outside,	thereby	co-constituting	not	only	the	possibility	of	oneself	but	the	selves	and	other	discernible	things	of	the	world.	Entangled	in	this	existential	drama,	the	self	survives	in	its	presumed	centrality	to	life.	But	to	think	from	the	 other,	 whether	 it	 be	 recognised	 as	 animate	 or	 inanimate	 or	 something	 altogether	
different,	seems	to	introduce	an	additional	crisis	in	one’s	living,	and	perhaps	one’s	studies	of	
what	could	be	within	or	other	than	oneself.			 It	is	doubtful	that	even	the	most	‘self-externalised’	or	‘self-pluralised’	fieldworker,	let	alone	a	philosopher	or	a	political	theorist,	can	so	discipline	oneself	in	worldings	of	the	other	that	 one’s	 own	 worldings—one’s	 being-in-the-world	 and	 one’s	 knowing-in-the-world—recede	into	nothingness.	Rather,	it	seems	obvious	that	worldings	flood	into	one	another,	co-constitute	each	other	further	and	further,	even	if	they	are	not	meant	to	do	so.	The	‘real	world’,	then,	may	or	may	not	be.	Life	and	one’s	worldings	continue.	 If	 this	 is	taken	but	as	a	basic	premise,	it	is	pertinent	to	ask	each	of	our	three	(imagined)	disciplinary	workers,	and	perhaps	Duncan,	too,	recalling	his	observation	that	‘[m]ost	of	the	things	in	the	world	are	“over	the	horizon”’:34	just	where35	is	your	field?			 Whilst	 this	 may	 be	 taken	 as	 a	 purely	 methodological	 question,	 such	 move	 might	obfuscate	the	drama	of	mutual	worldings.	Neither	is	the	anthropologist,	whose	fieldwork	is	so	 often	 posited	 as	 elsewhere,	 nor	 other	 workers	 of	 the	 ‘social’	 or	 the	 ‘political’,	 whose	dealings	with	the	self	sometimes	seem	more	easily	discernible,	immune	from	the	crisis	that	
																																																						33	Ibid:	60.	34	Kennedy	2001:	1153.		35	 It	would	be	equally	pertinent	to	ask,	 for	example,	when	 is	your	field,	except	that	this	essay	does	not	explicitly	deal	with	the	temporality	of	critique	and/or	disciplinary	temporalities.		
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entails	distinguishing	a	worlding	of	the	other	from	that	of	one’s	own.	It	is	in	this—again,	most	basic—sense	 that	 elsewhere	 is	 political.36	 The	 challenge	 seems	 to	 be	 not	 only	 how	 or	whether	 to	 ‘represent’	 and	 ‘translate’	 the	 other’s	worldings,	 but	 also	 how	 or	whether	 to	acknowledge	that	they	have	become	(and	continue	to	become)	part	and	parcel	of	one’s	own	being-in-the-world	and	knowing-in-the-world.	Whilst	the	ontological	turn,	Butler	and	Buck-Morss	all	warn	against	certain	hegemony,	whether	of	representational	or	post-	and	super-structural	nature,	that	is	likely	to	manifest	in	the	process,	they	do	not	sufficiently	attend	to	what	seems	to	be	an	elementary	occurrence—that	worldings	spill	over	and	flood	the	all-too-crude	 distinction	 between	 ‘me’-‘us’	 and	 ‘you’-‘them’.37	 Moreover,	 not	 only	 one	(continuously)	 becomes	 with	 the	 other,	 but	 even	 one’s	 own	 becoming—as	 Buck-Morss	avers—is	not	only	perpetual	but	also	multidirectional.	This	is	sometimes	taken	as	a	certain	plurality	 of	 existence	 (of	 ‘worlds’	 and	 ‘us’-‘them’	 in	 them),	 but	 it	 does	 not	 have	 to	 be	described	as	such;	it	could	be	that	‘perspectives’	are	different	and	‘connections’	partial,38	or	that	there	are	worldings	that	are	not	readily	apparent	to	‘us’.39	Be	that	as	it	may,	spillages	occur.	They	can	be	critical—in	terms	of	the	crises	of	what’s	knowable	that	they	bring	forth—and	political—for	they	can	summon	some	apparently	disparate	worldings	together.			 In	Cruising	Utopia,	José	Esteban	Muñoz	describes	queerness	as	‘that	thing	that	lets	us	feel	that	this	world	is	not	enough,	that	indeed	something	is	missing’.40	Note	that	the	thing	speaks	of	itself41	here	and	that	it	speaks	to	an	imagined	us.	It	speaks	of	absence.	Who	are	we?	And	 how	 is	 this	 world,	 since	 to	 us	 it	 is	 not	 enough?	 The	 absent	 something	 suggests	 an	incompleteness,	not	just	of	this	world	but	of	our	worlding	in	it.	So	we	look	for	the	other	in	that	we	search	for	that	someone/something	that	the	thing	we	know	tells	us	is	missing,	in	a	world	we	don’t	quite	know	(for	it	might	not	even	be	‘ours’	for	all	we	know).	The	unknowable,	then,	spilling	from	elsewhere,	can	be	critical	and	political,	too.				
																																																						36	For	an	exemplary	study,	see	Trend	2016.	Needless	to	say,	elsewhere	is	always	philosophical,	too.	Suffice	it	to	mention	Heidegger’s	(1927)	own	take	on	being-in-the-world	(in-der-Welt-sein)	and	its	coterminous	
Dasein	(‘Being-there’),	which	has	its	humanly	aspect	in	Mitsein	(‘Being-with’),	suggesting	that	the	human	being	is	always	already	with	others	(of	its	‘kind’).	37	Note	 that	 it	would	be	even	cruder	 to	use	 the	slash	 (/)	 to	describe	 this	distinction	 (i.e.	 ‘me’/‘us’	and	‘you’/‘them’),	in	denial	of	what	seems	to	be	a	‘dividual’	(cf.	Strathern	1988:	13)	aspect	of	(at	least	some)	self-conception(s).		38	Cf.	Strathern	2004;	Viveiros	de	Castro	1998.		39	 It	 is	a	 little	suspect	 that	 the	exponents	of	 the	ontological	 turn	 in	anthropology	so	often	 look	 for	 the	examples	 of	 what	 I	 termed	 here	 as	 ‘ontological	 disparity’	 in	 lands	 and	 people	 that	 are	 all-too-often	portrayed	as	physically	(and	in	many	other	ways)	distant	from	an	imagined	‘us’.	It	is	equally	suspect	that	continental	philosophy	and,	sometimes,	political	theory	rely	on	a	reverse	move:	abiding	by	a		‘tradition’	that	is	ostensibly	‘ours’	in	ways	more	than	one.		40	Muñoz	2009:	1	(emphasis	mine).		41	Lacan	1966b:	408.		
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